Countering David Hume’s Arguments Against the First Cause Argument.

David Hume makes an argument against the existence of God in his work entitled Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion The commentary below shows Hume’s arguments are false.

The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all.

Hume asks a good question – why does an infinite series of cause exist, rather than any other explanation for an effect we now see? Hume proposes an answer but his answer fails.

If there be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe.

An infinite series is equally possible to ‘nothing having existed from all eternity’. Hume misunderstands what equally possible means however. For both an infinite series and nothing having existed from all eternity are both not possible, even though Hume thinks both are possible. An infinite series of causes cannot exist for such a series would never cause. Also nothing could not have always existed for nothing is not a cause, and now something exists. So there must have always been something existing other than nothing.

What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed to be none.

The prime being is the prime candidate, which Hume ignores below.

Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a Deity.

Correct, the Deity is the necessary being which is not refuted by Hume.

I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it.

I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.

Here is a contradiction that occurs if the existence of God is denied. God is the necessary being, which cannot not exist. If God does not exist, then that which is existence, does not exist. This statement is reduced to that which is A is not A. Hence Hume's statement that there is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction, is false.

Hume also states without proof that there is no thing that we can conceive of as that which does not have to exist. Yet the necessary being is that which we can conceive of which must exist and cannot not exist. Hume therefore must be confusing intellective knowledge and imagination. We can know what the necessary begin is, but we can also imagine that the same necessary being may not have to exist. Does the imagination actually conclude to anything about the real, or only confuse one to imagine something have no existence when in fact that thing must always exist. The imagination of Hume has played tricks with him.

It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present.

Hume says we cannot perceive a Deity as that which is impossible not to exist. Hume has reduced the objective truth of the necessary Deity down to his claim of a subjective truth that is in turn not possible to think of the necessary as always existing.

It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.

Hume has reduced the Deity down to a contingent thing which is only understood subjectively to either exist or not. Hume’s understanding of the Deity is false. The Deity is the necessary being, regardless of Hume’s inability to grasp the reality.

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five.

The material universe is not the necessary being, for the material universe has a diversity of essences and being. The necessary being has an identity of essence and being.

I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said[]Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it.

Hume’s notion of the Deity is false. The Deity is not subject to the imagination of men who don’t understand what the necessary being is. The Deity is pure act, which means the Deity cannot be changed, for change infers potency. But potency I excluded by pure act. The so called inconceivable qualities are really only the logical outcome of the real identity of essence and being in the Deity. All is one, and simple in God.

The material universe is not the necessary existent, for the material universe is a composite of contingent things, which pass from can be to does be and back to can be again. The necessary Deity, always does be.

Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

The claim to an infinite regress of causes has many unresolved problems. See the thread on Bertand Russell’s arguments against the first cause argument, and this link for details. The problems with the infinite series are unresolvable. Furthermore, the question of a cause prior to the Deity assumes the Deity is caused, when in fact the Deity is that thing which is uncaused.

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty?

One of many difficulties with an infinite series is all the members of the series are contingent. Hence the series itself is contingent. Hence there is no evidence that such a series does actually exist, even if one posits that the series may exist.

But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things.

The nature of the infinite series is a series of natures, each of which is contingent. So no member of the series need exist, let alone is there any evidence that such a series actually does exist. Further, the question concerning the parts of the series is provocative. If the series has parts, then it has infinite parts. How then did all the parts get together to form an infinite series. If the parts were not always together an infinite time is required to arrange the infinite series even before the series acts to cause anything.

The problems with the infinite series are many and varied and remain unresolved. It is one thing to invent the possibility of an infinite series, but quite another to explain/resolve all the problems associated with the series.

Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.

So an infinite series has parts which are explained by explaining the cause of the parts. If the cause of the parts explains the infinite series, what then explains how the parts came together to form the series. The parts may exist, granted, but how did they get arranged within a finite time to cause the universe as Hume says? No answer as usual, because the enlightenment is a movement that is fundamentally flawed. One of the fundamental flaws is it’s implicit and explicit humanism which must deny the existence of the only thing in the universe that actually matters at all – the Deity.

Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or design:

Yes regularity is a mark of design and an intellect. The design of the universe does conclude to a prime intellect.

but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty?

Hume concludes from an analogy of necessity in numbers to necessity in design of nature. The necessity of design of nature is false, for nature has passive potency, which implies an active agent which is an intellect as the prime designer. For example a glass jar has received the form of jar from the designer. The designer is the agent that act to place he form into the glass. The glass does not of necessity act to place the form of jar into the glass. 

Likewise all natures that are ordered always have passive potency. The apple tree did no design itself to grow, and produce apples. The apples tree received the forms from another agent. The series of agents has its natural term in the unordered orderer who is the prime orderer of all natures. 

And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis!

Yes natures can have both stable and changeable dispositions. Water is always water, but water can flow as a fluid and not flow as a solid and move as a gas. Hume thinks all these dispositions are of necessity, but such necessity does not exclude a prime Deity as the designer, but only grants further evidence for the existence of the Deity, who orders all natures as through a partial copy of His own nature as Deity. Hume’s great leap from the necessity numbers to the necessity of natures, whilst ignoring the passive potency in natures to receive forms implies Hume’s analogical argument is false.

Hume’s argument does have something to consider. Hume does correctly state natures are have intrinsic properties which cause the dispositions of necessity. But Hume fails to grasp the extent of the problem. For Hume assumes the natures can be accounted for without any reference to the prime orderer, who grants order to all things. So even if Hume’s science enquiry into matter reveals much about say the nature of water, the nature of water itself is not accounted for by water alone. For water alone never causes water alone, or any natural property of water, for no natural thing can cause itself to come into existence. So water, like every other natural thing, is never the ultimate originator of any intrinsic property of any natural thing and consequently not the prime originator of any consequent, or necessary disposition of matter. God as the orderer of all things is the prime originator of all things, who grants contingent things existence and their natures. Without the prime being, natures would not have natures, and would not have being to actualise those same natures.

As usual with enlightenment philosophy, Hume’s argument against the prime orderer and prime cause miserably fails.


JM

An Argument for the Spirituality of the Human Intellect.

The following is a discussion on the Spirituality of the Human Intellect. Several terms are defined and examples given along with arguments to show the human intellect is a spirit (not a body).


Definitions.

Primary matter – The first can be, or potential constitutive principle of corporeal substance, or potential to substantial form. Primary matter lacks all be entitativity. Primary matter (PM) has a natural passive appetite for form as PM is ordered to the reception of form, as can be is order to receive does be. PM is potential to substantial form.

Secondary matter - is body or complete corporeal substance, taken with abstraction from whether it be of this particular species (apple) or of that different species (e.g. water, or zinc). Secondary matter is known only as a complete corporeal substance, and in potency to accidental forms (quantity, quality, relation, place, etc).

Knowledge as an Immanent Act

An immanent act is an act that occurs inside the agent that does the act. For example, nutrition and growth are two immanent acts had inside man. Knowledge is had when the known (tree) is in the knower (man). For knowledge is had when knowledge attains known (tree) as an object. The object attained in knowledge is an object (tree) had inside the knower (man). Therefore, knowledge is an immanent act.

Further, the thing known may not always be present to the knower. Peter knows the tree, but the tree may not always be present to Peter. Peter's knowledge of the tree is then not attained outside himself, but inside himself as an act of the knower. Such an act of knowledge is an immanent act.

Known (tree) Is in Knower (man) for the Knower (man) Has the Form of The Known (tree)

The act of knowledge is an immanent act, whereby the known (tree) is in the knower (man). Each thing is known as the thing is in act. For example, the eye sees the colour red, as the colour is in act as red and not potentially red, or in act as blue. Similarly, the man knows the tree as the tree is in act as tree and not a potential tree, or in act as a dog.

As a thing is in act through the form, then a thing is known in act through the form of the thing known. For example, the tree is in act as a tree. The act of tree as tree is caused by the substantial form of tree, which is tree-ness inside the tree. The tree-ness is a determinative form within the tree that acts as the formal cause of the tree to be a tree, rather than another thing, such as a cat, or dog. When the tree is known by the man, the form of tree is then inside the man. For the form of tree as the determinative form of tree, is also the determinative form of the tree as known as tree within the knower. The form of the known (tree) is in the knower (man), as it is the determinative form of the known (man). The determinative form of tree is then in the man as the known is in the knower to have the form of the known.

The determinative form of the tree is had inside the knower (man). But to know a thing is to have the power of knowledge to act upon the thing known (tree). For to have a power to act upon a thing is the have the thing known as an object of the power. The determinative form of the tree is had inside the knower (man) is then the object of knowledge. The form of tree had inside man is the object of the man's knowledge. But because the tree is the object of the man's knowledge, the tree is not the man, but only the form of tree had inside the man. Therefore, the form of knowledge is the object, inside the knower, which is other than the knower.

Knowledge as an Objective Act

The manners in which Matter has form are exposed to show knowledge is objective.

Matter has form in ways diverse from the manners in which the knower (man) has the form of the known (tree). Matter has form -

Subjectively - the form received becomes the form of the matter and not the form of another thing. For example, the form of heat received into water, becomes the heat of the water and not the heat of steel. The heat received by the water is subject to the water, and not the steel.

Physically - the matter that receives the form is physically changed. For example, the matter of water is physically changed by heat to hot water when the form of heat is received into the water. Also, the contrary form of cold is removed from the water, when the water becomes hot water.

Composed - a union of the matter and form results in a new compound. For example, the union of matter of water with the form of heat results in the compound of hot water, which is neither water, nor heat. The water and heat acts as part of the third compound, as hot water.

The knower has form -

Objectively - the form of the tree in the man is not limited to the man, but is the form that remains also the form of the tree. The subjective reception of heat into the water removes heat as belonging to another (say the stove, or fire), for the heat received into the water is not long the heat of the fire, but the heat of the water alone. However, the act of knowledge has the form of the tree had inside the knower (man), whilst the form of tree also remains belonging to the tree. Or again, when the man knows the heat of iron, the heat known is not the heat of the man, but the heat of the iron. The heat of the iron is then a form of heat had as an object of knowledge.

Above the physical - The form had by the knower (man) is the form of another thing (tree). The man does not become hot or cold when hot or cold are known. For hot and cold remains the hotness and coldness of the thing known and not of the knower. The form had in the knower does not cause any physical change in the knower. Therefore, the form had in the knower is had an a way above the physical, termed the supra physical.

Not composed - The act of knowledge does not cause a compound of the knower and the known. The man who knows the tree does not become a tree-man in the act of knowledge. In fact by the man having the tree as an object of knowledge, the man becomes the tree by knowing the form of tree had in the intellect. Again, for example, if the man knows the heat of the iron, the heat known does not cause a hot man. The heat known causes the man to remain the man, and the heat of the iron to remain the heat of the iron. The heat known does not cause a composite of hot-man. Therefore, knowledge is had in a manner that is not composed, and thereby incompositvely.

Conclusion - As the form of the thing known is had in a manner that is objective and not subjective, not physical and not composed, the act of knowledge is had in a manner that is not material. The act of knowledge is then an act that is immaterial, and thereby spiritual. For that which is spiritual is properly immaterial. For a spirit is that which exists and acts without a material body. 

The evidence from experience that knowledge is an act that is both immanent and objective leads to the conclusion that man has a being and an act inside him that is not material, but properly spiritual. The spirituality of man thereby is a consequence of the experience of knowledge, but also saves the immanence and objectivity of knowledge. For without the spiritual reality within man, knowledge is only another act of having form as matter has form.

Immateriality of the Intellect as the Root Cause of Knowledge 

A knower is able to have the form of another, whilst the form remains the form of another. A non knower is only able to naturally have its own form and not the form of another. The root cause is the intrinsic reason a thing is a knower. That intrinsic reason is the immateriality of the knower, whereby the knower acts from an intrinsic power that is properly spiritual. Also, the root cause of knowledge is also found on the side of the thing known, whereby the thing known can be raised above the material to the immaterial. The ability of a thing to act beyond the material, as immaterial and free from the individuating bounds of the material is the root cause in things for things to be known.

Immateriality on the side of the knower and the known is the root cause of knowledge. The immateriality of the human intellect, is termed negatively immateriality, whereby the human intellect exists and acts above the material, properly as a spirit. The immateriality on the side of the thing known is the immateriality of the thing as it is raised above the material - eminential immateriality.

Proof of the Spirituality of the Human Intellect.

1. A power which is independent of a corporeal organ is independent of matter with regard to its existence and acts is properly spiritual. 
2. The human intellect has nothing corporeal in its own nature.
3. For the human intellect can know all bodies and thereby must not have as its own nature a body. 
4. For the intellect is the power whereby the knower becomes the known, whereby the intellect becomes the nature of all bodies.

Defence- 

The parts of the above argument are defended.

1) and 2) are explained above in the discussion on the nature of knowledge as an immaterial act.

3) What becomes all bodies is according to its own nature not a body.
For just as water is indifferent to being hot or cold and thereby the nature of water is not hot, nor cold.
For if water’s nature is to be hot, then cold is naturally excluded.
But neither hot nor cold are excluded from water.
Therefore, water’s nature is not determined by hot, nor cold.
Then similarly, the human intellect is indifferent to any body, just as water is indifferent to hot or cold.
Then similarly the human intellect has a nature that is not determined to be any body.
For any particular body to be the nature of the human intellect, the intellect would then exclude all other bodies, like heat as the nature of in water would exclude cold in water.
Therefore, that which can know the natures of all bodies, must have nothing corporeal, in its own nature.

Point 3) may also be defended in accord with the principle of indeterminacy which says – that which can be many is of itself not any of the many that the thing can be. Water can be many temperatures, and water is not of itself a temperature. Clay can be many shapes and is not of itself any particular shape. And likewise the human intellect can be many bodies, and then is not of itself a body.

4) The intellect becomes the nature of all bodies – 

The intellect becomes the form of the thing known. 
For the knower in the act of knowledge is constituted as regards what it is, inasmuch as the knower is drawn to be what the thing outside the knower is.
And to be constituted as regards what the outside thing is, is to become identified with the thing known.
But to become the form of the thing known is to become the essence of the thing.
For the essence of a thing is that which befits being. For example, an apple has the nature of apple-ness which befits the act to be of the apple.
But being contains all essences.
Therefore, by the intellect knowing the essence of things, it knows being and is able to know all the essences contained by being.
As being contains all essences, then the human intellect can know all essences.
As essences are manifested in bodies, therefore the human intellect can know all bodies.

Conclusion – the spirituality of the human intellect is proven.

A short Proof for the Spirituality of the human Intellect 

A supra-organic power is a power that transcends the corporeal order. 
The formal object of the human intellect transcends the corporeal order. 
For the formal object of the human intellect is abstracted, universal, essence, as understood. 
As the universal does not exist in the individual, or corporeal order, then the human intellect has a formal object that transcends the corporeal order. 
As the object transcends the corporeal order, then so to the power of the human intellect also transcends the corporeal order. 
As do follows be, then the act of the human intellect to know follows upon the being of the human intellect. 
As the act of the human intellect attains an object the transcends the corporeal order, the being of the human intellect also transcends the corporeal order. 
That which has being and act which transcends the corporeal order exists and acts without a body. 
That which exists and acts without a body is properly spiritual. For a spirit is that which exists and acts without a body. 
Therefore the human intellect is properly spiritual.

JM

A Critical Appraisal of Faith as an Instrumental Cause of Justification.

A short appraisal of the Reformed doctrine of justification by faith alone is given using the correct notions of principle and instrumental causation. The doctrine of justification by faith alone, where faith is an instrument of justification is presented below. Following the presentation, the discussion proceeds through two examples using principle and instrumental causation to then highlight some problems with the doctrines propounded by the Westminster confession of faith.

Westminster confession of faith states –

1. Those whom God effectually calleth, He also freely justifieth: not by infusing righteousness into them, but by pardoning their sins, and by accounting and accepting their persons as righteous; not for any thing wrought in them, or done by them, but for Christ’s sake alone; nor by imputing faith itself, the act of believing, or any other evangelical obedience to them, as their righteousness; but by imputing the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto them, they receiving and resting on Him and His righteousness by faith; which faith they have not of themselves, it is the gift of God. 

2. Faith, thus receiving and resting on Christ and His righteousness, is the alone instrument of justification: yet is it not alone in the person justified, but is ever accompanied with all other saving graces, and is no dead faith, but worketh by love.

3. Christ, by His obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all those that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to His Father’s justice in their behalf. Yet, in as much as He was given by the Father for them; and His obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead; and both, freely, not for any thing in them; their justification is only of free grace; that both the exact justice, and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners.

4. God did, from all eternity, decree to justify all the elect, and Christ did, in the fulness of time, die for their sins, and rise for their justification: nevertheless, they are not justified, until the Holy Spirit doth, in due time, actually apply Christ unto them. 

5. God doth continue to forgive the sins of those that are justified; and, although they can never fall from the state of justification, yet they may, by their sins, fall under God’s fatherly displeasure, and not have the light of His countenance restored unto them, until they humble themselves, confess their sins, beg pardon, and renew their faith and repentance.

6. The justification of believers under the old testament was, in all these respects, one and the same with the justification of believers under the new testament.

The parts of the Westminster Confession underlined above are relevant to the discussion below.

Definitions

Principal causes - efficient causes which by their own proper power operate unto an effect proportionate to the nature of the agent are called. The effect is produced by the cause or is principally moved by the proper power of the agent, not by a motion received from another cause. Principle cause is defined as -

Prime Principal cause – God acting as the first principle cause. 

Secondary Principal cause, - the principle cause is moved materially (or applied to the actual exercise of its own power) by the prime cause (God). Such as a man is moved by God to carve a statue. God is the prime cause and the man is the principle, secondary cause.

Instrumental cause - the proper and formal reason why something is an instrumental cause consists in this that it operates as moved by a principal agent, forasmuch as the whole power and reason of operating are received after the manner of a fluid entity from a subordinating or principal cause. 

Instrumental cause, has being-moved as the precise cause of the instrument acting. Thereby the effect of the instrumental cause is not conformed to the instrument, but to the principle agent. Consequently, the instrumental cause always only ever has a transient causation when the fluid entity that moves the instrument to move as it is moved by the principle cause acts upon the instrument.


Example 1. The Poet writes the Poem with a Pen –

For example, the pen as the instrument is moved by the poet as the principle cause, to write the poem. The motion of the pen caused by the poet is the fluid entity acting on the pen for the pen to act subordinate to the movement of the poet. The poem written is then not conformed to the pen, but to the poet as the author of the poem. Both the poet and the poem continue to exist as poet and poem after the pen has ceased to act as an instrument. The pen only acts as an instrument whilst the poet acts to write the poem.

In summary -

Principle secondary cause – Poet.

Instrumental cause – pen when a poet uses the pen as an instrument to write the poem.

Fluid move – motion of the pen.

Poem – a thing as an effect which is conformed to the poet as the principle author and not the pen as the author.

Example 2. God justifies the Sinner by the Instrument of Faith alone.

We now apply the same understanding of instrumental cause to the reformed understanding of faith as an instrument. The Westminster confession of faith states faith is the alone instrument of justification. According to the Reformed doctrine, Christ merits justification as a penal substitute, whereby Christ is punished by the Father who imputes men's sins to Christ and Christ's righteousness to men through the instrument of faith alone. Faith is given to men through the Holy Spirit who works in men to cause men to believe. Once the act of faith is made, the man is imputed Christ's righteousness by the Father in a courtroom scene as part of the great exchange.

In summary -

Principle Prime Cause - Trinity, or more particularly the action of 1) the Holy Spirit within men to cause the act of faith. 2) Christ as the meritorious cause of faith and righteousness. 3) The Father who imputes Christ with sin and the sinner with righteousness.

Principle Secondary cause – man moved by the Holy Spirit to make the act of faith.

Instrumental cause – Faith as an act made by man, which also acts as an instrument of justification. The act of faith is the fluid, transient instrumental cause only when the act of faith is made. Faith may also be a habit as a virtue that resides in the human intellect. If faith is a habit, then the habit of faith is an act contrary to the notion of instrumental cause. For instrumental cause is chiefly defined by the fluid move of the principle cause and not an ongoing disposition placed into the efficient cause by the principle cause. 

For example, a blacksmith may change the shape of a piece of metal and give the metal the shape of a horse shoe. The new shape does not cause the metal to become an instrument. The metal is only an instrumental cause when the metal shoe is worn by the horse. The horse’s wearing of the shoe grants the metal shoe the motion from the principle cause to move the shoe as an instrumental cause. When the metal shoe is removed from the horse, the metal is no longer and instrumental cause.

Fluid move – motion of men to make the act of faith. Faith is the act whereby the Holy Spirit as the prime principle cause (Holy Spirit) who acts upon the man as the secondary instrumental cause to move a man to an act of faith.

Justification - a thing (like a poem) as an effect which is conformed to the Holy Spirit as the principle author of faith and not the man who made the act of faith and thereby man is not the author of faith. Justification is also a thing conformed to Christ as the meritorious cause of justification and a thing caused by the Father at the heavenly courtroom to pronounce the sinner righteous.

An appraisal of the above comparison of the two examples of Instrumental causation. 

If faith is both an act and an instrumental cause of justification, faith must act in accord with the nature of an instrument and act with the prime and secondary principle causes to produce an effect as a thing, analogous to the poem. Faith then must cause justification as a fluid motion towards the end, or term of the acts of the prime and secondary principle causes, like the poet acts with the pen to write the poem. Faith is then a fluid act, which passes, but cause justification to remain, similar to the motion of the pen that passes, whilst the poem remains. Consequent to the reformed notion of faith as an instrument, justification must always remain even after the act of faith has stopped. 

But is this notion of justification by the instrumentality of faith alone biblical? We can compare the reformed notion of faith as an instrument and the consequent permanence of justification with the famous parable of the ten virgins. In Matt 25, ten virgins all had faith to meet the bride groom, but only five were able to enter into the wedding banquet (Matt 25:1-13). The five virgins who were excluded from the banquet had faith but lost their justification. The parable of the ten virgins is strong evidence against the permanence of justification by faith alone. Many other passages can be brought forward to demonstrate eternal security is false, such as 1) Matt 10:22 where Christians are saved by endurance to the end. 2) In 1 Corinthians 9:24-27 Paul says he may become a castaway (adokimos), which is used in 2 Timothy 3:8 and in Romans 1:28 for those who commit sin. 3) Galatians 5:19-21 and 1 Corinthians 6:9-11 details sin lists that exclude one from the kingdom. Such lists assume faith, but infer many virtues are required to be practiced other than faith alone to enter the kingdom. 4) Christians who have known the way of righteousness can return to the mire of sin in 2 Peter 2:20-22 and thereby lose righteousness.

Furthermore, faith as an instrument is caused by Christ as the meritorious cause and the Holy Spirit as the prime principle cause acting within man. But if faith is an instrument, and the instrument only acts in accord with the motion of the prime and secondary principle causes, like the pen moves by the poet, then how does faith act as an instrumental cause to cause the Father to impute sin to Christ and righteousness to the sinner? For faith to act as an instrument, consistently with the notion of an instrument as that which is moved by the principle cause, does not infer the instrument acts to cause the principle cause to act on another principle cause.

The problem with faith as an instrumental cause may be better clarified by comparison with the example of the poet and pen. If the pen is the instrumental cause, moved by the poet, for the pen to act like faith, the pen would then cause the poet to move after the poet has caused the pen to move. This simple analogy of the pen shows how problematic the reformed notion of faith as an instrument really is. There is no possibility that the pen moved by the poet, then causes the poet to move. The pen as an instrument receives its power only from the poet to move. The pen does not have any power given it from the poet, nor existing at any time within the pen to cause the poet to move. For the pen to cause the poet to move would be 1) contrary to the power within the pen, 2) contrary to the nature of instrumental causation and 3) contrary to the causes which always act proportionately to the power contained within the cause.

If the pen cannot cause the poet to move, for no instrumental cause can cause the principle cause to move, how can the reformed faith claim faith as an instrument causes the Father to move to impute sin to Christ and righteousness to the sinner? If faith is an instrument as claimed by the reformers, faith cannot cause the double imputation and consequently according to the Reformed model, there is insufficient causation to demonstrate how justification occurs. For Reformed theologians to claim faith moves the Father to act means the Holy Spirit as prime principle cause, man as secondary principle cause, cause to move the habit of faith to the act of faith. Faith then acts as an instrument to cause the Father as prime principle cause to impute sin to Christ as another prime principle cause and righteousness to the sinner as the secondary principle cause. Such a series of causation from prime to instrument, then back to the prime, and the secondary prime is simply beyond the correct notions of principle and instrumental causes.

Moreover, if faith is an instrument, justification must be attributed to the Holy Spirit as the prime principle cause and the man as the secondary principle cause and not faith. Just as the poem is attributed to the poet and not the pen, which is only a fluid mover of the poem under the motion of the poet. So, justification cannot be attributed to faith, but to the Holy Spirit and man. The reformed may agree with this analysis and say, yes man is attributed justification through faith as an instrument, just as you say. But the problem here is man acts as principle cause of justification, just as the poet acts as principle cause of the poem. If man is the principle cause of justification, then justification becomes in principle, a humanly caused act. Justification is then not simply only the work of the Trinity, but the work of the Trinity and man, both acting as principle cause. Justification is then never a completed work of the Trinity, but a work of the Trinity made with the work of men. 

To attribute principle causation to men in justification infers Reformed Christianity cannot make any claim to justification as the work of the Trinity alone. Faith is said to be a gift of God, and justification by faith is, according to the Westminster confession, an act of ‘faith they have not of themselves’, it is the gift of God. But the Reformed understanding requires man be the secondary principle cause of faith, and thereby man makes the act of faith of himself, contrary to the Westminster confession and the scriptures. Just as the poet is attributed the poem, for the poem is from the poet, so too justification must also be attributed to man, for man acts to cause justification through the instrument of faith. The problem of attribution of justification to man is enormous. Although the Reformed confessions state faith and justification is the work of God as a gift, logically from the nature of instrumental causation, faith and justification are gifts of God along with the work of man as the principle cause of faith.

One may try to counter claim that even with the above problems, faith still acts as an instrument and the double imputation theory along with the doctrines of the Westminster confession still hold. For the Gospel is the power of God for those who have faith (Rom 1:16). The power of God then acts with faith as an instrument for faith to have a power beyond that of the example of the poet who writes with the pen. The problem with appealing to faith acting with the power of God is that faith would no longer be an instrument under the motion of the principle cause, but a miraculous cause that acts with a divine power beyond that of an instrument. Here the Reformed objection to the above problems runs into trouble, for nowhere in scripture is faith stated to be a miracle, nor have miraculous powers. Faith is stated in scripture to be a gift from God, but not a miracle. Moreover, nowhere in the Reformed confessions s faith ever stated to be a cause of the miraculous action of the Father, nor of Christ as an effect of men’s faith as an instrument of justification.

Conclusion

The short appraisal of the Reformed teaching on faith as an instrument of justification highlights some of the many problems with Reformed theology. The reformed doctrines on justification are taught with the claims of truth in opposition to the Catholic teachings enunciated at the Council of Trent, but such claims are rather well falsified by investigating the notion of instrumental cause in relation to principle cause. When the notions of principle and instrumental causes are clarified with the above two examples of the poem and justification, it becomes rather obvious that there is something wrong with Reformed doctrines on justification.

The best alternative to the problematic nature of the Reformed understanding of justification is to abandon the Reformed confessions of faith and return to the one true faith as proclaimed by the Catholic Church at the Council of Trent. Faith is not an instrument of justification, but one of three theological virtues received by men when given by the Holy Spirit. The three virtues are given alone with the four cardinal virtues and about 60 other virtues to make the Christian fully alive as a man to live the Christian life. Justification is not an imputation of the righteousness of Christ as taught by the Reformers, but an infusion of the divine life of grace accompanied by the virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy Spirt. The Catholic teaching on justification need not grapple with the Reformed problems of faith as an instrumental cause of justification, nor the accompanying problems of the double imputation theory, for faith is not an instrument, but correctly taught as only one of three theological virtues. Justification according to Trent is not about imputation of Christ’s righteousness, but about infusing man with the life of God, to then permit men to live within the household of faith as Sons of God.

A Partial Appraisal of the Instrument of Faith in Relation to Formal Cause.

1) The Father's actions of Imputation in relation to the Instrument of Faith.

If we compare faith as an instrument to the formal cause we may discern if faith is well formed in relation to formal cause. The formal cause is placed into the material cause by the principle cause and the efficient cause. Using the example of the poet writing the poem, God (prime principle) moves the poet (secondary principle) to move (efficient) the pen (instrument) to cause the form (formal) of poem in the ink (material) and onto the page (material). Note that the instrumental cause is acted upon by the principle and efficient causes to place the form into the material cause to produce the final effect as the poem written on the page. However, with the Reformed notion of justification, the prime principle cause is the Father who acts to inform both Christ and the sinner -

(2i) The form of sin legally imputed to Christ.

(2ii) The form of Christ's righteousness legally imputed to the sinner's account.

The Father is said (by the Reformed) to act to cause the form within the following series of causes as shown in the quotes below.

1. Father (prime principle) moves
2. to send Christ (prime principle)
3. The Father (prime principle) imputes (efficient) sin (formal) to Christ (material).

Here the Reformed teaching requires the first part of the double exchange. The Father imputes sin to Christ. The act of the Father imputing sin is itself very problematic for reasons already exposed in Problems with the Westminster Confession of Faith Thread, particularly on posts 15 and 18. Two such reasons are the Father is acting unjustly towards the Son as God, who cannot sin and thereby the Father cannot justly impute sin to the Son. The second reason is if the Father does impute sin to the Son, both the Father and the Son are involved in a lie, and thereby God must sin for the Reformed double exchange to occur. Of course God is the prime truth and cannot lie. Take note that even with the problematic nature of the Father imputing sin to the Son, the act of the Father causing the form of sin to Christ, is an act that is only an occasion for faith. The Father in imputing sin to Christ, is not moved by the instrument of faith. Nor is the Father's act of imputation as direct cause of faith in any man. For the Father could impute sin to Christ and no man consequently have faith. 

Even if men have faith after the Father imputed sin to Christ, 1) the Father's act of imputation of sin to Christ is not caused by faith as an instrument, for the Father acts (principle) prior to faith (instrument) in any man. Faith is then only a possible effect of the Father's imputation of sin to Christ. 2) the Father's act causes faith to act as an instrument, and faith in turn is said to instrumentally cause the Father to impute Christ's righteousness to the sinners account. The Father then acts to cause the first imputation of sin to Christ, without the instrument of faith acting, but then faith acts as an instrument to cause the Father to impute Christ's righteousness to the sinner's account. The Father then acts both without the instrumentality of faith and from the instrumentality of faith to act to impute. The diverse manners of the Father's acts indicate the Father's action in relation to faith are both independent of and dependent upon faith as an instrument. 

As the Father acts to impute sin to Christ without faith causing as an instrument, one may question the veracity of the claim that the Father acts from faith as an instrument to impute Christ's righteousness to the sinner's account. Also because of the diversity of the Father's action in relation to faith as an instrument, one may also question the veracity of the claim that the Father does not act from faith as an instrument impute sin to Christ. The diverse action of the Father in relation to faith infers the Reformed soteriological system contains causes that are not well established. For if faith is an instrument that is claimed to cause the Father to act, how can such a claim be established when the same soteriological system also claims the Father acts to impute without faith as an instrumental cause? The problematic nature of faith in relation to the Father's acts of imputation infers faith as an instrument is not well formed in relation to principle causes.

2) The Instrument of Faith in relation to the Father's actions of Imputation.

However, with the Reformed notion of justification, the prime principle cause is the Father who acts to inform both Christ and the sinner -

(2i) The form of sin legally imputed to Christ.

(2ii) The form of Christ's righteousness legally imputed to the sinner's account.

The Father is said (by the Reformed) to act to cause the form within the following series of causes as shown in the quotes below.

1. Father (prime principle) moves
2. to send Christ (prime principle)
3. The Father (prime principle) imputes (efficient) sin (formal) to Christ (material).

4. The Father and Son (prime principle)
5. send the Holy Spirit (prime principle)
6. to cause man (secondary principle) to have faith (instrumental)
7. the Father imputes Christ's righteousness to the sinners account.

Note initially that the above four causes (4-7) are dependent upon the causes previously discussed (1-3). As the prior series of causes 1 to 3 involve the problematic notion of Father imputing sin to Christ, the subsequent causes 4-6 do not have sufficiently well-founded causes in 1-3. Further, here in point 6. in the above quote, the instrument of faith should act to cause a form with a material cause to affect the final outcome. Like the pen acts to place the form (formal) into the ink and paper (material) to affect the poem. But the Reformed notion of justification requires that the instrument of faith act to cause the Father (prime principle) to then cause another cause of imputation of righteousness to the sinners account. However, the instrumental cause as instrument cannot cause the principle cause to cause. For an instrument is only ever caused by the principle cause as an instrument of the principle cause. Therefore, faith as an instrument of the Holy Spirit and the man cannot cause the Father to act as the prime principle cause. 

If according to the Reformed, faith is an instrument, the Father acts to impute righteousness to the sinner's account, but where faith is thought to be an instrument but is only an occasion for the Father to act simultaneously with faith. An occasion is not a cause, but only a circumstance. Like a bird flies past a man and the man says, "look at the bird". The man speaks on the occasion (circumstance) of the bird flying past the man. The bird does not instrumentally cause the man to speak, but only provides the circumstance for the human speech. The bird could fly past the man and the man also remained silent as the same occasion is presented to the man. An occasion then does not necessitate instrumental causation. 

Similarly, because faith as an instrument cannot cause the Father to act as principle, faith can only be an occasion for the Father's consequent act of imputing Christ's righteousness to the sinners account. Moreover, faith as an instrument does not have a proper effect proportionate to the act of faith. The poem written by the poet, using the instrument of the pen, has the effect of the written poem as the proportionate effect of the pen acting under the power of the poet. If faith is an instrument, we would expect faith to cause a similar proportionate effect. If the action of the Father is not the proportionate effect of faith, then the Reformed understanding of faith as an instrument does not have any proportionate effect. Consequently, because an instrument without a proportionate effect, is not an instrument, faith is not an instrument.

Conclusion - The partial appraisal of the instrument of faith in relation to formal cause has shown the Reformed understanding of faith as an instrument is not well formed and is unsound. The Father sends the Holy Spirit, who causes men to act with faith. Faith is only the occassion (and not a cause) for the Father then to act to impute. Faith as an instrument is not well formed in relation to the formal cause of Christ's righteousness caused by the Father's imputation. Finally, as faith as an instrument does not cause the Father to act to impute, faith as an instrument does not have a proper effect. Faith is then not an instrument. For an instrument without a proper effect is only a thing that has not been used by a principle cause. The attribution of faith as an instrument is unsound.

A comparison of the Reformed Causes of Justification with St Thomas Aquinas' Causes of Justification.

The Reformers taught faith is an instrumental cause of justification. But as faith is both an act and a habit, neither can be an instrument. For the act is the efficient cause which moves man to believe, like the efficient move of the pen. The move as efficient  cause is not the pen as the instrumental cause. The habit is a dispositive cause of the intellect as a power, like that of a pen as a power that is well disposed to be moved by the man. The habit of faith allows the man to be well disposed to be moved by God to make the act of faith. But neither the habit, nor the man acting are instruments which are causes associated with the act of faith. The man is a supposit, and not an instrument, who makes the act of faith. Neither faith as an act, nor as a habit is an instrumental cause, for the act and the habit have operations that are outside the species of instrumental causation.

Furthermore, faith as an act and a habit is not an instrument due to the relationships of faith to the principle causes as taught in the great exchange. Faith is said to cause the Father as a prime principle cause to impute Christ’s righteousness to the sinners account. Faith as an instrument, then causes the Father as the prime principle cause to act. But such a causation is not well formed with the notion of an instrument as that which is caused by the principle causes, such as the poet who writes the poem, rather than the instrument which is moved by the principle cause (Holy Spirit) and which moves the principle cause (Father) to act.

The contrast between the Reformers understanding of faith and that of St Thomas is shown below by outlaying the causes.

In summary -

The summary given below includes the causes given in examples (1) and (2) above to provide an ease of comparison. 

(1) indicates the causes of the poem in example 1. 

(2) indicates the causes involved in the Reformed teaching on justification by faith alone. 

(3) indicates the causes as taught by Thomas Aquinas. 

Principle Causes

Prime Principle cause - (1) God as prime mover, or prime cause.

(2) God as the prime principle cause is the Christian Trinity, or more particularly the action of 1) The Father who imputes Christ with sin and the sinner with righteousness. 2) Christ as the penal substitute cause of faith and righteousness. 3) The Holy Spirit within men to cause the habit and act of faith. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three prime principle causes in the great exchange.

(3) God as the prime principle cause is the Christian Trinity. The Father as principle sends the Son. The Son is the meritorious cause of grace. The Father and Son as principle send the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit as prime principle cause, causes grace, the virtues of faith, hope, love, prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude, and the gifts - wisdom, knowledge, counsel, understanding, fear of the Lord, piety, and fortitude. Any imputation of righteousness occurs simultaneously with the infusion of sanctifying grace, the infused virtues and the gifts.

Secondary Principle cause – (1) Poet who writes the poem.

(2) man is the secondary principle cause moved by the Holy Spirit to have the habit of faith and make the act of faith.

(3) Man, as a supposit is the secondary principle cause moved by the Holy Spirit to have the habit of faith and to make the act of faith.

Secondary Causes

Efficient cause – (1) The fluid movement in the pen from the poet. The fluid move is extrinsic to the poet, but intrinsic to the pen.

(2i) The action of grace as the gift given by God to provide man with the habit of faith. 

(2ii) The action of grace as the gift given by God to move man to make the act of faith.

(3) The habit and action of grace as the gift given by God to move man to make the act of faith, with the habit of faith.

Instrumental cause – (1) The pen itself as a substance when the poet uses the pen as an instrument to write the poem. The pen as a thing moved by the primary and secondary principle causes to write the poem. The pen as an instrument of the poet is extrinsic to (outside) the poet.

(2) Faith as an instrument.

(3) Faith is not an instrument. There are no instrumental causes of justification attributed to any of the virtues or gifts. The seven sacraments are instrumental, secondary causes of grace, whereby God acts form the divine power to cause the sacrament to cause grace through the correct application of matter and form by the priest. The instrumentality of the sacraments is from God as the prime principle cause, and the priest as the secondary principle cause, which causes grace to be infused into the recipient as the effect of the sacrament. Sacramental causation is sound and well-formed and does not require an instrumental cause to cause a principle cause to act.

According to the Summa of St Thomas -

We must therefore say otherwise, that an efficient cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The principal cause works by the power of its form, to which form the effect is likened; just as fire by its own heat makes something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace: since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Peter 1:4: "He hath given us most great and precious promises; that we may be [Vulgate: 'you may be made'] partakers of the Divine Nature." But the instrumental cause works not by the power of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent: for instance, the couch is not like the axe, but like the art which is in the craftsman's mind. And it is thus that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace: for they are instituted by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "All these things," viz. pertaining to the sacraments, "are done and pass away, but the power," viz. of God, "which works by them, remains ever." Now that is, properly speaking, an instrument by which someone works: wherefore it is written (Titus 3:5): "He saved us by the laver of regeneration."

Formal Cause – (1) The form of poem received by the ink as written on the page.

(2i) The form of sin legally imputed to Christ.

(2ii) The form of Christ's righteousness legally imputed to the sinners account.

(3) form of sanctifying grace, the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Material cause – (1) The ink and page which receive the form of poem.

(2i) Christ, or Christ’s account, which receives the legal imputation of men’s sins.
(2ii) The sinner, or the sinner’s account, which receives the legal imputation of Christ’s righteousness.

(3) Man, who receives the infused virtues and the gifts.

Final Cause – (1) The final end of the poem, such as beauty, goodness, money, etc.

(2i) The glory of God as a motivation for the great exchange.
(2ii) The glorification of men as a motivation for the great exchange.

(3) The glory of God and the beatitude of the elect.

Effect – (1) The poem as a thing caused by the principle, efficient, instrumental, formal, material and final causes.

(2) The beatitude of the elect in heaven as the end product of the great exchange.

(3) The Christianisation of man, along with the ability of man to merit eternal life. The glory of God and the beatitude of the elect.

The Thomistic understanding of justification by faith is to have God as the prime principle cause acting to infuse the Christian life of grace into man. Once grace is received, man can live the Christian life and merit eternal life by free acts performed with grace. The infusion of grace, the theological and cardinal virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit order man's intellect, will and sensitive powers of concupiscence and irascible appetites towards God who is the supernatural Trinity, as the final, ultimate end of the man's moral life.

The union of the divine acts of imputing justification and infusing grace as an act of justification are both performed simultaneously by God as the prime principle cause. The action of God as the prime principle cause does not require that faith act as an instrument to cause God to do anything. The Thomistic understanding of faith as a cause, only causes the intellect to give assent to divinely revealed truths and thereby unite man’s intellect to God according to revealed truth understood. The union of man with God through the infused virtues does not require any infused virtue to act as an instrument, but only as either a dispositive cause in a power, as a habit, or as an efficient cause to enact the power, as through actual grace God gives to man.

The infused theolgical virtues direct man's intellect and will towards God as the object of the powers. The intellect has the habit of faith to know God as God knows himself. The will has the habit of charity to love God as He loves himself, and hope to desire God as a desired difficult good to be obtained. The theolgical virtues act to direct man's powers of intellect and will towards God as the object of the acts of faith, hope and love. As the object of the powers is God as supernatural, then the powers are raised to act in a supernatural manner to direct man to his supernatural ultimate end, as the Trinity in heaven.

All the causes within the Thomistic understanding of justification are sound and well formed.

JM