Countering David Hume’s Arguments Against the First Cause Argument.

David Hume makes an argument against the existence of God in his work entitled Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion The commentary below shows Hume’s arguments are false.

The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all.

Hume asks a good question – why does an infinite series of cause exist, rather than any other explanation for an effect we now see? Hume proposes an answer but his answer fails.

If there be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe.

An infinite series is equally possible to ‘nothing having existed from all eternity’. Hume misunderstands what equally possible means however. For both an infinite series and nothing having existed from all eternity are both not possible, even though Hume thinks both are possible. An infinite series of causes cannot exist for such a series would never cause. Also nothing could not have always existed for nothing is not a cause, and now something exists. So there must have always been something existing other than nothing.

What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed to be none.

The prime being is the prime candidate, which Hume ignores below.

Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a Deity.

Correct, the Deity is the necessary being which is not refuted by Hume.

I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it.

I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.

Here is a contradiction that occurs if the existence of God is denied. God is the necessary being, which cannot not exist. If God does not exist, then that which is existence, does not exist. This statement is reduced to that which is A is not A. Hence Hume's statement that there is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction, is false.

Hume also states without proof that there is no thing that we can conceive of as that which does not have to exist. Yet the necessary being is that which we can conceive of which must exist and cannot not exist. Hume therefore must be confusing intellective knowledge and imagination. We can know what the necessary begin is, but we can also imagine that the same necessary being may not have to exist. Does the imagination actually conclude to anything about the real, or only confuse one to imagine something have no existence when in fact that thing must always exist. The imagination of Hume has played tricks with him.

It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present.

Hume says we cannot perceive a Deity as that which is impossible not to exist. Hume has reduced the objective truth of the necessary Deity down to his claim of a subjective truth that is in turn not possible to think of the necessary as always existing.

It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent.

Hume has reduced the Deity down to a contingent thing which is only understood subjectively to either exist or not. Hume’s understanding of the Deity is false. The Deity is the necessary being, regardless of Hume’s inability to grasp the reality.

But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five.

The material universe is not the necessary being, for the material universe has a diversity of essences and being. The necessary being has an identity of essence and being.

I find only one argument employed to prove, that the material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. "Any particle of matter," it is said[]Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it.

Hume’s notion of the Deity is false. The Deity is not subject to the imagination of men who don’t understand what the necessary being is. The Deity is pure act, which means the Deity cannot be changed, for change infers potency. But potency I excluded by pure act. The so called inconceivable qualities are really only the logical outcome of the real identity of essence and being in the Deity. All is one, and simple in God.

The material universe is not the necessary existent, for the material universe is a composite of contingent things, which pass from can be to does be and back to can be again. The necessary Deity, always does be.

Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence?

The claim to an infinite regress of causes has many unresolved problems. See the thread on Bertand Russell’s arguments against the first cause argument, and this link for details. The problems with the infinite series are unresolvable. Furthermore, the question of a cause prior to the Deity assumes the Deity is caused, when in fact the Deity is that thing which is uncaused.

In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty?

One of many difficulties with an infinite series is all the members of the series are contingent. Hence the series itself is contingent. Hence there is no evidence that such a series does actually exist, even if one posits that the series may exist.

But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things.

The nature of the infinite series is a series of natures, each of which is contingent. So no member of the series need exist, let alone is there any evidence that such a series actually does exist. Further, the question concerning the parts of the series is provocative. If the series has parts, then it has infinite parts. How then did all the parts get together to form an infinite series. If the parts were not always together an infinite time is required to arrange the infinite series even before the series acts to cause anything.

The problems with the infinite series are many and varied and remain unresolved. It is one thing to invent the possibility of an infinite series, but quite another to explain/resolve all the problems associated with the series.

Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.

So an infinite series has parts which are explained by explaining the cause of the parts. If the cause of the parts explains the infinite series, what then explains how the parts came together to form the series. The parts may exist, granted, but how did they get arranged within a finite time to cause the universe as Hume says? No answer as usual, because the enlightenment is a movement that is fundamentally flawed. One of the fundamental flaws is it’s implicit and explicit humanism which must deny the existence of the only thing in the universe that actually matters at all – the Deity.

Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or design:

Yes regularity is a mark of design and an intellect. The design of the universe does conclude to a prime intellect.

but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the difficulty?

Hume concludes from an analogy of necessity in numbers to necessity in design of nature. The necessity of design of nature is false, for nature has passive potency, which implies an active agent which is an intellect as the prime designer. For example a glass jar has received the form of jar from the designer. The designer is the agent that act to place he form into the glass. The glass does not of necessity act to place the form of jar into the glass. 

Likewise all natures that are ordered always have passive potency. The apple tree did no design itself to grow, and produce apples. The apples tree received the forms from another agent. The series of agents has its natural term in the unordered orderer who is the prime orderer of all natures. 

And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis!

Yes natures can have both stable and changeable dispositions. Water is always water, but water can flow as a fluid and not flow as a solid and move as a gas. Hume thinks all these dispositions are of necessity, but such necessity does not exclude a prime Deity as the designer, but only grants further evidence for the existence of the Deity, who orders all natures as through a partial copy of His own nature as Deity. Hume’s great leap from the necessity numbers to the necessity of natures, whilst ignoring the passive potency in natures to receive forms implies Hume’s analogical argument is false.

Hume’s argument does have something to consider. Hume does correctly state natures are have intrinsic properties which cause the dispositions of necessity. But Hume fails to grasp the extent of the problem. For Hume assumes the natures can be accounted for without any reference to the prime orderer, who grants order to all things. So even if Hume’s science enquiry into matter reveals much about say the nature of water, the nature of water itself is not accounted for by water alone. For water alone never causes water alone, or any natural property of water, for no natural thing can cause itself to come into existence. So water, like every other natural thing, is never the ultimate originator of any intrinsic property of any natural thing and consequently not the prime originator of any consequent, or necessary disposition of matter. God as the orderer of all things is the prime originator of all things, who grants contingent things existence and their natures. Without the prime being, natures would not have natures, and would not have being to actualise those same natures.

As usual with enlightenment philosophy, Hume’s argument against the prime orderer and prime cause miserably fails.


JM