On Bertrand Russell’s argument against the First Cause Argument for God's Existence.

An exposition is presented below to expose the errors of Bertrand Russel’s arguments made against the first cause argument for God. 

The English philosopher, Bertrand Russell, proposed an argument against the first cause argument for God, in his book entitled, Why I Am Not a Christian. According to Stanford Encylcopedia, Russell is widely held to be one of the 20th century's premier logicians. 

Together with G.E. Moore, Russell is generally recognized as one of the main founders of modern analytic philosophy. His famous paradox, theory of types, and work with A.N. Whitehead on Principia Mathematica reinvigorated the study of logic throughout the twentieth century (Schilpp 1944, xiii; Wilczek 2010, 74).

Russell’s argument is presented in a series of short quotes and exposed as fallacious. Bertrand Russell states the following -

The First-cause Argument Perhaps the simplest and easiest to understand is the argument of the First Cause. (It is maintained that everything we see in this world has a cause, and as you go back in the chain of causes further and further you must come to a First Cause, and to that First Cause you give the name of God.) That argument, I suppose, does not carry very much weight nowadays, because, in the first place, cause is not quite what it used to be. The philosophers and the men of science have got going on cause, and it has not anything like the vitality it used to have;

Russell’s statement is fallacious. Philosophers disagree on many notions. For philosophers to change the meaning of cause does not provide any evidence against the argument for the first cause. Russell should have shown the reader how the new meaning of cause is more true and real and then shown how the new notion of cause makes the first cause argument unsound. As Russell has not provided any evidence to support his claim, Russell has committed the error of the unsupported assertion. Also Russell does not continue with the use of his so called new notion of cause, thereby committing the fallacy of the irrelevant premise.

but, apart from that, you can see that the argument that there must be a First Cause is one that cannot have any validity. I may say that when I was a young man and was debating these questions very seriously in my mind, I for a long time accepted the argument of the First Cause, until one day, at the age of eighteen, I read John Stuart Mill's Autobiography,

John Stuart Mill's argument predates Russell's argument. So now Russell is using a notion of cause in Mill's argument, even though Russell has already stated above that the notion of cause in Russell's time is not as vital as of prior times. So what notion of cause is Russell referring to when Russell uses Mill's argument? We don't know, so the argument premise concerning the definition of cause is unknown. So if Russell is consistent with his own criticism of cause, he should not have used Mill's argument.

and I there found this sentence: "My father taught me that the question 'Who made me?' cannot be answered, since it immediately suggests the further question `Who made God?'"

'Who made me?' can be answered. An answer is your parents. Another answer is God as the creator of your soul and the cause of your being. The claim that the question cannot be answered because we don’t know who made God is also false for we can know God made man, and then posit the question, 'who made God?'. Then we can then show God is being without limit, so God is the prime, uncaused being. As God is the prime, the question 'who made God?' is answered - no one, for God does not require a cause.

Russell's argument assumes there must always be an infinite regress to account for every member in the series. But the infinite regress is only ever assumed and never proven. The appeal to the infinite regress has many unresolved problems, two of which are presented below –

No causation within the Infinite Series 

An infinite regress of causes is against the nature of cause, for if an infinite regress is posited, every member has the same deficiency in causation, and therefore no member is ever a cause. Or every member is assumed to be a caused cause within the series, but the infinite regress requires an infinite delay for each caused cause as having been caused by a prior, infinite regress. Hence due to the infinite delay implied in the infinite regress, no member is ever a caused cause. The delay is concerned with a series of causes causing now, therefore the delay is always now. Hence a delay that is always present is only ever a delay and not a cause happening now. Therefore as no member in an infinite series is ever a cause, the infinite regress does not account for any cause. Therefore, the questions such as 'who made me?' and 'who made God?' are not solved by an appeal to any infinite regress.

One may object and say the infinite series is series where all the causes act now. Such a series has no delay; therefore an infinite series can have caused causes and causation. The answer is similar to the above problem. Even if the infinite series occurs now, with all causes acting at once, still no cause within the series is ever a caused cause. For causes are ontologically prior to the effect. For an infinite series of causes to exist, each cause is also an effect. Hence each cause is always dependent upon an ontologically prior cause. The ontological priority of caused cause upon a prior infinite number of causes infers each caused cause is ontologically after an infinite number of causes. But the infinite priority of causes has each member deficient in causation. Hence there is never any cause that is not deficient within the infinite series. Such an infinite series then cannot have any real causes within the series. Hence an infinite series of causes that occur now cannot be real.

The natures of Cause and Effect mitigate against an Infinite Series.

Another problem with the infinite series is according to the nature of cause and effect. A cause is a positive influence regarding the being of another thing. An effect is that which is positively influenced regarding being. As cause influences the effect, the effect will always have something of the similitude of the cause. As the similitude of the cause has less being than the cause, the effect will always have less being than the cause. Therefore, if an infinite series is posited, each member of the series is a cause, and an effect of the prior series of causes. 

Hence as each cause has less influence upon the consequent caused cause, for an effect is always less than its cause, then an infinite series will always result in no being as its ultimate effect. For an infinite series will always have each caused cause have less being than the prior caused cause. So if any-thing is observed to have being, an infinite series cannot be assumed to account for the existence of that thing. Hence no infinite series of causes is possible to cause any thing. As an infinite series of causes cannot exist, then only a finite series of causes can exist. Finite series always has an ultimate term, which is the prime being, which is God.

One may object by saying an effect does have the same being as the cause. Therefore an infinite series is possible. However, the objection is opposition to the nature of cause and effect, whereby the effect always participates in the influence of the cause and is never identical to the cause. A poet causes the poem. The poem does not have the same being as the poet.

Even if we propose a cause and effect series such as that of the father generating the son, that appears to have an equivalence of effect to cause, such a series is not pertinent to the notion of infinite regress. For infinite regress requires all members of the series to act now. Whereas the father, son series does not require both the father and son to always be acting now. The father generates the son, but the father need not always exist for the son to exist, or the son to generate another man. In an infinite series, each member must act together, at the same time for all members to cause the same final effect. The father, son example is then not pertinent to the notion of the infinite series.

Zero Ultimate effect and Zero Causation within an Infinite Series

 

A similar problem occurs with any member of the infinite series of caused causes. If the final effect of the infinite series of caused causes is zero, then all caused causes likewise have zero being as causes. For if any member in the infinite series has no being, then every member in the same infinite series also has no being. Hence an infinite series of caused causes is self-refuting.

 

[b] The Finite and Infinite power of each member of an infinite series [/b]

 

If it is claimed that an infinite series is still possible, then the infinite series that causes a finite thing as a finite effect of the series, must entail ontologically prior causes which are infinite in being according to an infinite power to cause. For 1) only an infinite cause existing in an infinite series can cause a finite effect at one end of the infinite series, and 2) A finite cause cannot produce a finite effect in an infinite series as shown above. Such an infinite cause within the infinite series cannot occur as each member of the series can only ever be finite. For an infinite cause within any series is the ultimate, first cause of that series. That infinite cause is God.

 

Inefficiency of an Infinite Series Mitigates Against the Existence of the Series

 

Another problem with an infinite regress is the series is most inefficient. For nature always acts efficiently and tends to not act inefficiently. The most inefficient way to act is through an infinite series. For the series requires an infinite number of causes, when nature always is observed to act more efficiently through only a finite number of causes. To posit an infinite series of causes to explain the existence of the universe requires the natures contained within the universe to always act in a way that contradicts the very causal reason of how the universe is said to exist.

 

A finite series acts efficiently. Finite series of causes are regularly observed within the universe. Yet an infinite series, which is most inefficient is claimed to be the real cause of the entire universe. Such faith in an infinite series of causes is against all observation and the nature of observed causation within the universe. Hence, because that which is most inefficient is most ineffectual, and the most ineffectual is the most improbable explanation for an effect, the infinite series is most improbable.

 

Nature of Being Mitigates Against an Infinite Regress

 

Being is the actualisation of all acts. When a block of wood has being, an act of being is received by the nature of wood to cause the wood to be in act. The being of the wood is caused by being received, whereby being is an act that is only being. For an infinite series of caused causes to cause the being of the wood, the caused causes are either

 

1)         physical things (with essence and being), which have being. The series of things can then be either bodily or non bodily. If bodily, then there is an infinite series of bodies in act that give the wood the being it receives to be in act. Such a series is not possible, for an infinite series of bodies would all have to compenetrate each other, forming an infinite mixture of essences. If non bodily, then there is an infinite series of spirits that cause the being of a physical block of wood. But an infinite series of spirits (angels) do not exist, nor do angels cause the being of physical things (as known from divine revelation). So an infinite series of creatures does not act to cause the being of any physical thing.

 

2)         A series of beings (no essence, and only being). But such an infinite series means there are beings without essences. But being without essence is only finite being that does not enact an essence. But finite being cannot occur without an essence. For finite being only ever acts to enact an essence and thereby bring an essence from potency to act. Therefore, an infinite series of finite beings cannot act to cause the being of the wood (or any finite thing).

 

Therefore from the nature of being, which enacts essence, there is no possibility that an infinite series of creatures can act to cause the being of any physical thing, such as the block of wood.

 

Nature of Being as Finite Mitigates against an Infinite Series of things causing being of a Thing

 

A physical thing has a finite being received to make actual the essence of the thing. The block of wood only has the being of wood and no more. For an infinite series of beings, or things causing the being of the block of wood, the infinite series must exist now, always acting in the present and collectively only ever cause the finite being that actualises only the being of the wood. The infinite series than contains an infinite being, but only affects a finite being in the wood. The disproportion between the finite being of the wood and the infinite being of the infinite series is against the nature of being. For being causes act in proportion to being. Being as act, causes a proportionate act. Hence an infinite being proportionately causes an infinite act and not the finite act to be of the block of wood. Hence the disproportionality of infinite to finite being mitigates against an infinite series of things causing being of a finite thing.

 

No Being of a Thing causes the Being of another Thing Mitigates against an Infinite Series of things causing Being 

 

There are no examples of things acting to cause the being of another thing from one instant to another instant. There are examples observed that cause things to come into being, such as generation of children. But the causation of bringing into being does not follow through to any ongoing causation of being in the thing generated. As there are no observed examples of any creature causing the being of another creature from one instant to the next, there is no precedent in nature to posit any creature can cause the being of another creature.

 

Indeed from the nature of being itself as the actualisation of all acts, we expect being alone to be the cause of a creatures being. That being which causes the being of other creatures must have its nature as being itself. Such is God.

 

The truth and expediency of Nature in Physical things Mitigates Against an Infinite Regress

 

Physical things are composed of essence and being. The union of essence and being to cause a thing to exist does not lend itself to caused by an ever present physical presence of an infinite series of other things. For the essence of a thing, say iron, is iron and not a composite of an infinite series of other essences, but is per se the essence of iron. Iron as iron and not a combination of many other things is a natural truth and expediency, of iron, consistent with all other natural physical things. Therefore because the nature of things have a natural truth and natural expediency, an infinite series of things causing one essence to be is unnatural and therefore an unworthy explanation for the existence of any physical thing.

 

The Improbability of an Infinite Series Mitigates Against an Infinite Regress

 

An infinite series of creatures must itself have its own reason of be. A finite series has its reason of be in the prime being. But an infinite series has no ultimate reason of be in any member, and therefore not in the series in toto. Hence an infinite series, that has no reason of be from itself, is from itself most improbable to exist. Hence the nature of an infinite series as most improbable infers the infinite series solution to the problem of existence is most improbable.

 

The Implied Alchemy of an infinite Regress Mitigates Against an Infinite Regress 

 

If an infinite series causes the block of wood to exist. And each member of the series is itself a thing that has being. Each member of the series has a nature. As each nature causes in accord with its nature to produce an effect like itself, an infinite series must act together with infinite natures, to cause the existence of one nature. The infinite mixture of natures in an infinite series causing one nature, as the block of wood, is an extreme example of alchemy. As alchemy in chemistry and physics are false, for both chemistry and physics demonstrate there are limits to what is affected through mixing bodies, then similarly alchemy in metaphysics is also false.

 

For the principles and conclusions of metaphysics always underlie the observations and theory in the empirical science. A-posteriori, the empirical sciences also point backwards to metaphysical principles. Therefore, if alchemy in the empirical sciences is false, then there is a metaphysical principle that prevent universal mixing of bodies to cause other bodies. Therefore, an infinite series of causes that cause only one nature is an act of alchemy that is against the nature of bodies and natures as determined by metaphysics. Consequently, any claim to an infinite series of causes is always false.

 

As the infinite series argument is false, the atheist only has two other options. Firstly, the series is finite and begins with non being. But as non being does not cause, then a finite series of beings caused by non being is impossible. Secondly, a finite series started by a finite thing. But such a series only leaves the problem of received being unresolved with the first thing which must receive its own being from another. Hence the third option of an infinite being as the prime being is the only viable solution to the problem of contingency. Such a solution is that proposed by theism.

 

The problems with Russell’s inferred infinite series claim are insurmountable. The question ‘Who made God?”, is answered by noting there is no infinite series beyond God, for the above reasons. And because God is the self-contained being, who is unreceptive to any cause, God is the only answer available to resolve the problem of the existence of contingent things.

That very simple sentence showed me, as I still think, the fallacy in the argument of the First Cause. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.

The first cause argument is better stated as - every finite thing has a cause. But the infinite being does not have a cause.

If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the world as God, so that there cannot be any validity in that argument.

The world is both finite and contingent. God is infinite and necessary. Russell is in error.

It is exactly of the same nature as the Hindu's view, that the world rested upon an elephant and the elephant rested upon a tortoise; and when they said, "How about the tortoise?" the Indian said, "Suppose we change the subject." The argument is really no better than that.

Now Russell ignores the first cause argument and claims the first cause argument is actually the same as the Hindu infinite series. Russell is in error.

There is no reason why the world could not have come into being without a cause;

The principle of sufficient reason says there is sufficient reason for anything to be and to act. Russell thinks the world came from non-being, which is a breach in the principle of sufficient reason. Russell's argument is fallacious.

Another error in Russell's thinking is if the world came into being without a cause, then non-being which is not a cause also produces an effect. But in accord with the definitions of cause and effect, and effect has sufficient reason from the cause. If the cause is non-being, then the effect is also non-being. But Russell thinks the world is an effect of non-being. Evidently Russell doesn't know what a cause or an effect is.

nor, on the other hand, is there any reason why it should not have always existed.

Russell makes a giant leap from the fallacious notion of the world coming into being without a cause, to the world always existing. Russell simply doesn't know that the world always existed. He only assumes that as a response to the first cause argument. Even if the world did always exist, God would still be the first cause of the world, and any other contingent thing. For no contingent thing exists from itself, but always receives being from another. The other that causes the being of the contingent is that thing which is being by nature - God.

There is no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning at all.

There is a reason - divine revelation says the universe was created. Even if revelation is ignored, a philosopher can posit the world was created and then make arguments for and against such a proposition. Russell seems to be oblivious to the fundamentals of philosophical enquiry. A philosopher is supposed to ask questions about the nature of things and propose arguments. A philosopher can then propose arguments about the nature of creation of anything from non-being through an agent. Russell has simply ignored this option. Russell's thinking is fallacious.

Furthermore, the 'no reason to suppose' is a universal negative which is virtually impossible to prove. Russell's statement is then only his evidence free conjecture about the origin of the universe.

The idea that things must have a beginning is really due to the poverty of our imagination.

Russell previously inferred God had a cause, and thereby began, when he asked the question 'who made God?'. Now Russell claims if we assume that things must have a beginning we have a poverty of imagination. According to Russell's own argument, he has the same poverty of imagination in one part of his argument that he claims others have in another part of his argument.

Therefore, perhaps, I need not waste any more time upon the argument about the First Cause.

Russell's argument was solid evidence for the ease with which educated men can make fundamental blunders when they speak about a part of reality with which they fundamentally disagree about. If a man doesn't want God to exist, then reason is not required to defend his fundamental need to will God away.

JM