An Argument for the Moderate Number of Scientific Facts as having a Superstitious Nature.

Science contains much that is contrary, due to the nature of the inductive method which permits many and various explanations for the same observations. The various explanations infer several or many causes posited to exist, that may in fact not be real. If not real, science is then open to scientific explanations that contain causes that do not have the power to cause the effects observed. Such explanations are then aligned with a superstitious understanding of reality.

If a scientist claims there is evidence for a theory that contains false causes, the purported scientific evidence is only evidence for a superstitious theory, and consequently is only superstitious evidence. The observation may not be superstitious, such as the observation of a galaxy. But the claim that the observation is evidence for a scientific theory is itself a superstitious claim of superstitious evidence.

The scientific claim like saying a man claps his hands and the door opens. The academy invents a scientific theory that accounts for the opening of the door through the clapping hands causing the door to open. The clapped hands are observed and the observation is claimed as evidence for the theory. The science theory however falsely assigns causation to the clapping hands when the cause of the door closing was the wind. The claim for the clapping hands as evidence for the door closing is only a superstitious claim of superstitious evidence for a superstitious theory.

Science history bears witness to the existence and subsequent removal of scientific theories. Science history then bears strong testimony to the existence of many theories that propose either non-existence or false or inadequate causes to account for the observations. Each scientific theory that is debunked is evidence for the ongoing existence of models and scientific understandings of the world that assign causes that are in some manner false. As the proposed causes are false, the debunked theories were accepted at least for some time as having explanatory value when in fact the theories were false. Such falsity within science theories provides strong support for the superstitious nature of science and the associated claims of scientific facts.

Even if a theory is not ever debunked, competing theories that purport to account for the same or similarly associated observations infer that one or more of the competing theories are superstitious. For example, the claims that observations that confirm the existence of gravitational lensing associated with general relativity theory are observations that do not match other contrary theories such as Newtonian mechanics, which does not require or predict any gravitational lensing. We may also posit, say 10-20 predictions made by general relativity theory that are not predicted by other theories. We may also posit 10-20 predictions made by two or more other similarly associated physics theories that are not predicted by general relativity theory. The accumulation of predictions made by several competing, contrary but similar theories implies the empirical sciences have a moderate number of so-called scientific facts that are in fact only observations subject to a method that causes said observations to take on a superstitious nature.

Conclusion - Within the empirical sciences, there is a moderate number of scientific facts, that due to the inductive method that permits several explanations for the same observations, have a superstitious nature.