The Problem of the Presumption of Many Creatures that Naturally Cause the Existence of only One Creature Consequent to Atheism.

Atheism may posit an infinite series of causes to account for the existence of contingent substances. To posit such a series infers many causes produce only one effect. Such a presumption is not of itself in error but is a presumption that must be examined. For frequently only one, or maybe a few causes are required to produce only one effect. For the nature of one cause is to produce only one effect. So when more than one cause is present, it is natural to posit more than one effect is present.

One may object and give examples of a series of causes that produce the one effect. For example, many causes are required to produce the effect of the bottle of milk. But the many causes themselves also have many distinct effects other than the bottle of milk. Such as the cow eats the grass and grows, the machine milks the cow and so on. Yet the regress of causes, which contains an infinite number of causes, is posited by atheism to only produce one effect. But such a series cannot exist from the nature of multiple causes that always produce more than one effect.

For where there are many causes, those causes are usually of diverse species of creatures and diverse species of causation. Such diversity of causation infers a diversity of effects produced by the causes. Yet the infinite regress of causes must posit that all the causes within the series are the same to produce the one creature which has a nature diverse from other creatures. For example, a series of causes produces a tree stump. Another series of causes produces a metal beam. The stump and the beam are diverse, which infers the two series of causes must have both identical causes within each specific series to produce the one effect.

Series 1 has the same causes within the series to produce the stump. Series 2 has the same causes within the series to produce the beam. The same causes are required to ensure only one effect is produced from the series. For if there is a diversity of causes within the one series there is a diversity of effects expected from the one series. Such a diversity of effects would then not account for the existence of a creature such as a stump, for the stump plus other effects of the series would exist. But the two series must also have causes diverse from the other series to produce the two diverse effects of stump and beam. For if the causes within both series are the same, then the same effect is expected, say the stump in both cases.

So the causes in each series must be very specific and all the same to produce the one effect of the one creature by the one series. Such a grouping of a large number of causes to act together to cause only one effect become more improbable the more causes are involved. For the more causes involved, the more diversity of effects are expected. As an infinite series of identical causes is most improbable, then an infinite series does not account for the existence of any creature. Therefore, atheism’s appeal to an infinite series is false and therefore atheism is false.